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GENDER EQUALITY REDUX
Ratna Kapur* and Brenda Cossman**

ABSTRACT

This article offers a broad review of gender justice jurisprudence in India
between 1993 and 2022. In analysing some of the landmark judgements
on women's rights in the intervening years, the authors find the judicial
approach to gender equality uneven and at times, conflicting. Despite the
significant advancements in the jurisprudence ofgender equality and dignity,
discrimination and inequality persist on a staggering scale. The article argues
for the continued importance of subjecting equality jurisprudence to feminist
critical inquiry, which pays attention to the deeper structural and systemic
issues that impact gender equality.
Gender justice jurisprudence has undergone a sea change in India since the
publication of our 1993 article. Landmark judgements have included the
right to sexual autonomy established by the Supreme Court's 1996 Vishaka
decision setting out the guidelines for sexual harassment;' the recognition
of sex workers' rights to be free from sexual violence; 2 the upholding of the
right of an adult woman to marry or live with anyone of her choice; 3 the
striking down of the ban on a menstruating woman's right to worship at the
Sabarimala shrine in the southern state ofKerala;4 the recognition of online
stalking as violative of a woman's right to dignity5; the expansion of the
arena of reproductive rights, including a ban on advertisements relating to
pre-natal sex determination techniques in order to curtail female foeticide 6;
and the granting of permission to terminate a pregnancy past 24 weeks on
medical grounds. 7
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Interestingly, many of the most significant judgements on women's rights
have not been decided under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution but rather,
within a judicial discourse of gender justice. These are decisions where
the Court did not have to engage in a comparative equality analysis. The
differences between women and men-so significant in earlier jurisprudence
dismissing equality claims-have not come into play. Instead, the courts have
focused on dignity and gender justice. At the same time, norms of gender
equality have migrated beyond the narrower realm of non-discrimination
based on sex protected by Article 15. Regardless of whether the Court has
considered a case of sex discrimination under Articles 14 and 15 or some
of the broader rights to gender justice, the protectionist approach that
once seemed so entrenched in the judicial decision has at times given way
to a more substantive vision of women's equality. Courts have repeatedly
disavowed the idea of women as frail and in need of protection, a vision that
was used to justify differential-and discriminatory-treatment.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in 2020 according female army
officers equal entitlements to male army officers and the option to hold combat
positions are amongst the latest cases to challenge gender stereotypes.8 In
Babita Puniya, the Court specifically rejected the government's argument
that the restrictions on women were justified because of the peculiar
'operational compulsions' or 'inherent risks'. 9 The Court refused the idea
that women were either the 'weaker' or 'inferior' sex. Instead, it held that
'arguments founded on the physical strengths and weaknesses of men and
women and on assumptions about women in the social context of marriage
and family do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal
opportunity to women officers.' The Court also rejected the government's
argument that the troops were not mentally prepared to take command from
female officers, holding that such a view was based on 'sex stereotypes' that
attribute specific roles to women and are, hence, discriminatory.10
8
9
lO

Secretary, Ministry ofDefence v Babita Puniya (2020) SCC Online 200; Aparna Bhat v The State Of
Madhya Pradesh (2021) sec 230.
ibid 18, para 25.
The decision is a major shift from the classification test applied in the Indian air hostess' cases
where termination of service upon pregnancy and responsibilities in marriage were upheld by
the court: Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1982) SCR l at 438; See also Joseph Shine v Union of India
(2019) 3 SCC 39 where the court struck down section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 that criminalised adultery. The court held that the provision perpetuated the idea of women
being a property of a man as well as stereotypes of women being the weaker or inferior sex. Such
assumptions were discriminatory and undermined gender equality rights; and Anuj Garg v Hotel
Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1, where the court struck down s. 30 of the Punjab Excise Act
1914 that excluded women from working on premises where liquor was served. The court hat the
right to self-determination was of upmost importance in gender justice and that the existing law
was based on protectionism and perpetuated sex stereotypes. It was a form of both direct and
indirect discrimination that forms a part of Article 15.
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Yet, despite the significant advancements in the jurisprudence of gender
equality and dignity, discrimination and inequality persist on a staggering
scale. There is, of course, the inevitable gap between law on the books and
law in action. But there are other factors at play in judicial approaches
themselves. Despite the advances in the judicial promotion of women's
rights, the discourse within which these rights have been protected often
remains problematic.
First, the judicial approach to questions of gender remains at best divided.
The shift to a more substantive vision is anything but unanimous. Consider
the split decision by the Delhi High Court on whether the marital rape
exception in the Indian Penal Code violates Articles 14, 15(1), 19 (1) and
21 of the Constitution.11 Justice Shakdher struck down the provision as
unconstitutional on all these grounds, holding that consent was the core of
sexual relations and could not be a ground for distinguishing between forced
sex outside of marriage and the same act committed within marriage. He
was unequivocal in stating that the act constituted rape.12 The provision
failed the reasonable classification test of Article 14. According to Justice
Shakdher, the right of individual autonomy and consent is primary both
within and outside of marriage.
In contrast, in 2022, Justice Hari Shankar upheld the constitutionality of
the exception on the understanding that sex in the marital relationship is
distinct from other relationships insofar as the former carries a legitimate
expectation of sex. In this view, a woman's consent to sex carries less weight
in a marriage. Accordingly, he held that the distinction was sufficient to
constitute a reasonable differentia under Article 14 and to classify nonconsensual sex in marriage as 'not rape'. This decision not only speaks to
how dominant gender norms remain deeply entrenched in judicial discourse
but also how the formal equality model enables and justifies distinctions that
can undermine gender equality. The split decision represents the two views
that persist in equality jurisprudence.
On an even darker note, there is a question of the judiciary's lack of
commitment to its own past decisions, evident in the abysmal failure of the
Supreme Court's performance when one of its own stood accused of sexual
harassment. In 2019, a court staffer brought a complaint of sexual harassment
and intimidation against the then Chief Justice of India, Ranjan Gogoi,
11
12
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who sat on the initial panel to hear the complaint. Justice Gogoi denied
all charges and alleged that there was a 'larger conspiracy to destabilise
the judiciary'.13 In a subsequent hearing by a three-judge panel conducted
over two dates, the complainant was denied legal counsel, cautioned not to
speak to an attorney, and denied several of her requests: to have a support
person present; to have the hearing conducted along the lines of the Vishaka
guidelines for workplace sexual- harassment; to have a video recording and
written record of her statements; to call and cross-examine her witnesses;
and to call for and submit in evidence the records and messages of relevant
mobile numbers. Not only was the inquiry a closed-door process held in
secrecy, but there was also minimal documentation of the process. Ultimately
the complainant submitted a widely circulated statement of her refusal to
participate in the proceedings considering the denial of due process. The
former Chief Justice appeared before the panel to deny the charge. The next
day the panel exonerated their brethren Justice and held that there was no
substance to the allegations. It further stated that the committee's report
constituted part of an in-house procedure and was not 'liable to be made
public'. The Court not only failed to abide by the principles of its own ruling
in the Vishaka judgement, but also used the privilege and power of Supreme
Court justices to position themselves as beyond reproach and simultaneously
impugn the character and speech of the complainant.
The subsequent mass street protests against the Justices' shameful display
of closing ranks to protect their own were met by the state with the force
of water cannons, and the deployment of Rapid Action Force personnel
and the Delhi Police. Several dozens of the protesters, including young
women, were injured and detained. The Court sent a chilling message to
women throughout the country that they will not be heard, their complaints
will remain suspect, and their testimonies will remain questionable. This
message reproduces the very gendered norms that the principle of gender
equality is intended to challenge and address. The Court's performance had
a damaging impact on aspiring law students and a new generation of young
lawyers who have been trained and live in a world where gender equality is
not a favour or exception-it is an entitlement. The two cases attest to the
intransigence of dominant gender norms, the persistence of the myth that
13

India Today, 'CJI-Led Bench Holds Hearing on Sexual Harassment Charges against CJI Ranjan
Gogoi' India Today(20 April 2019) <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ cji-led-supreme-courtbenc h-h old-unusual-hearing-on- matterof-great-public-importance-1506092 - 2019 - 04 - 20>
accessed 6 June, 2022; Complainant, 'Press Release by Former Supreme Court Employee and
Complainant in Sexual Harassment against CJI' (30 April 2019) <http://images.assettype.com/
barandbench/import/2019/04/press-release.pdf> accessed 6 June 2022.
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women are not to be believed, and the social construction of women as less
legible, less entitled subjects of law.
Finally, the Court's approach to women's rights remains deeply problematic
in the intersectional context of gender equality and religion. Equality has
often been pitted against religion. However, the way in which this plays out
depends partly on the religion at issue: Hindu or Muslim. As we have argued,
the discourse of equality has played an important role in the discourse of
the Hindu Right and its vision of secularism. 14 It adopts a formal approach
to equality based on sameness in treatment to argue in favour of treating all
women the same. This position translates into treating all Muslim women
the same as Hindu women, with the majority used as the (Hindu) norm
against which others (Muslims) are judged. Secularism, understood as the
equal treatment of all religions, requires that all religious communities be
treated the same; however, the norm against which others are judged is the
majority Hindu norm. Any special treatment of religious minorities-such as
accommodating their personal laws-is seen as a form of appeasement and a
violation of the constitutional guarantees of equality and secularism.
This vision of formal equality and secularism has played out with the
judiciary all too willing to wade into the rights of Muslim women. In
such cases, religion is immediately suspect, with Islam cast as oppressive
and barbaric, particularly in its treatment of women. This was seen in the
earlier, much-criticised Shah Bano decision. The Supreme Court held that
section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring a husband to pay
alimony should apply, contrary to Muslim personal law, which only required
the husband to pay maintenance for three months. 15 The decision ignited
a longstanding controversy over Muslim women's rights, Muslim personal
law and the desirability of a Uniform Civil Code. While many applauded the
decision for upholding the rights of women, others were more circumspect
about the Court's willingness to both disregard and denigrate Muslim
religious laws. The case highlighted the ways in which religion and equality
are pitted against each other, particularly in the context of Muslim women,
and equality won.

14

15
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Ratna Kapur & Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagement with Law in India (SAGE
Publications 1996); Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, 'Secularism's Last Sigh? The Hindu Right,
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Decades later, the opposition persists, as seen in the Triple Talaq decision. 16
In 2017, a constitutional challenge was brought by Shayara Bano, a Muslim
woman and mother of two, backed by the Indian Muslim Women's Movement,
against the practice of triple talaq. The petitioner argued that the law violated
her fundamental rights to equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian
Constitution and her life and liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court
considered whether the practice of triple talaq was essential to Islam and
thereby protected by the fundamental right to freedom of religion enshrined
in Articles 25 and 26. In short, the majority of the Court said no, triple
talaq was not essential to religion, was not protected within the freedom
of religion, and yes, it violated the rights to equality of Muslim women.
Many hailed the judgement as a decisive victory for Muslim women's rights;
others expressed concern about how the decision plays into the political
agenda and discourse of the Hindu Right.17 Throughout the judgement, the
Muslim woman is repeatedly referred to in protectionist language. She is
represented as a long-suffering victim who needs to be rescued either by
the courts or the legislature. For instance, the treatment of Muslim women
under personal law is referred to as 'oppressive' and 'disgraceful'. There are
repeated references to the 'plight' and 'suffering' of Muslim women who,
it is implied, experience a worse fate compared to women of other faiths.
While in some contexts, the courts have moved away from such protectionist
discourse, when it comes to Muslim women and the opposition between
equality and religion, it has not.
The triple talaq case suggests that these equality 'wins' need to be seen
within the broader context of the Court's willingness to intervene in the
sphere of religion when the particular religion (Islam) is itself treated as
suspect. Consider the intermarriage case. While upholding the right of a
woman to marry whomsoever she chooses, the Supreme Court subjected
the right and choice of a Hindu woman who converted to Islam to marry a
Muslim man to intense scrutiny18 The woman was subjected to surveillance
by the National Intelligence Agency to investigate fears that she could be
recruited by ISIS in Syria and become a threat to the nation. In subjecting
the rights of a Muslim woman to such strict surveillance, the Court not only
compromised her equality rights but also positioned her at the lower end of
a gender hierarchy and determination of who constitutes a legitimate, loyal
16
17
18

Shayara Bano v Union ofIndia AIR 2017 9 sec 1.
See Ratna Kapur, 'Gender and the "Faith" in Law: Equality, Secularism, and the Rise of the Hindu
Nation' (2020) 35(3) JLR 407-31.
Shafin Jahan v Ashokan KM and Ors. (2018) 16 sec 408.
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citizen-subject deserving of rights. The paternalism that is manifest in this
decision remains present in many other cases addressing women's rights,
and the shadow figure of the liberal-now Hindu-saviour continues to loom
large in cases dealing with woman's rights.
Contrast the cases involving Muslim women with those involving Hindu
women. In the case of access to worship at the Sabarimala shrine by
menstruating women, the equality rights of women were seen through
the lens of freedom of religion-not in contrast to it. The Supreme Court
ultimately vindicated menstruating women's rights to access the temple,
but it did so without denigrating religion. The voices of opposition cast the
debate as one of the oppositions between equality and religion, where religion
needed to be protected above all, and where there was no discrimination
because women were 'different'. The Kerala High Court had upheld the
prohibition as not discriminating against women as a class but just as a
subgroup (between the ages of 10 and 50). Not only was there no violation
of equality, but religion alone trumped: 'the deity does not like young ladies
entering the precincts of the temple'.
The Supreme Court did not follow this vision. Instead, the majority struck
down the rule banning entry on several grounds, including that it violated
the right to equality of women and undermined Hindu women's rights to
worship at the shrine, contrary to their fundamental rights to freedom of
religion under Article 25 19 :
Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump over the element
of pure devotion borne out of faith and the freedom to practise
and profess one's religion . . . Any rule based on discrimination or
segregation of women pertaining to biological characteristics is not
only unfounded, indefensible and implausible but can also never pass
the muster of constitutionality.20
In its judgements, the Court did not so much oppose equality and religion as
read equality into religion. Justice Mishra, for example, wrote:
In no scenario, can it be said that exclusion of women of any age group
could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the
contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu
women to enter into a temple. 21
19

20
21

64

Indian Young Lawyers Association (n 4).
ibid para 96 (Mishra CJ).
ibid para 78 (Mishra CJ).

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL JOURNAL

VOLUME 16, ISSUE 1

Equality is not opposed to the Hindu religion but is a part of it. Justice
Nariman similarly approached the issue as one of equal access of women
to the fundamental rights of freedom of religion: 'the fundamental right
of women between the ages of 10 and 50 to enter the Sabarimala temple
is undoubtedly recognised by Article 25(1)'. 22 This is not a case of pitting
gender equality against the right of freedom of religion, but a reading of
both as being equally guaranteed. Justice Chandrachud went further in
specifically adopting a substantive approach to equality. 23
On the one hand, the case is a victory for Hindu women that did not
reinforce the opposition between equality and religion. In multiple opinions,
the Court avoided the conflict between gender equality and the majority
religion. But it is important to note the distinction in treatment between
Hindu and Muslim women and their respective religions. By reiterating
the exemplariness of Hinduism in not discriminating against women's
rights to worship, the Hindu faith comes out unscathed-unlike the Court's
treatment of Islam. The case also produced a significant backlash, with a
storm of protests against the government's attempt to enforce the decision,
protests supported by the Hindu Right.24 While they favour equal treatment
of Muslim and Hindu women, they are not as enthusiastic about treating
Hindu women the same as Hindu men.
The uneven and, at times, conflicting approaches to gender equality speak
to the need to subject equality jurisprudence to feminist critical inquiry. In
revisiting this subject 30 years after our original piece, what remains evident
is that gender equality does not move in a linear and progressive direction. It
remains a site of contestation, where competingvisions ofgender and equality
continue to be fought out alongside secularism, religious majoritarianism
and the rights of religious minorities. Feminist critical inquiry remains
attentive to the deeper structural and systemic issues that impact gender
equality, as well as how struggles for equality remain tethered to normative
understandings of gender, sex and the very identity of the postcolonial
nation. It is for this very reason that gender equality jurisprudence needs to
be constantly monitored, revisited and interrogated.
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